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Rodrigues-Neto (2009) has shown that a given speciﬁcation of posteri-
ors of diﬀerent players in an incomplete-information setting is compatible
with a common prior if and only if the posteriors satisfy the so-called cycle
equations. This note shows that, if, for any player, any element of the
partition of the this player has a nonempty intersection with any element
of the partition of any other player, then it suﬃces to verify the cycle
equations for all cycles of length 4 or less.
Key Words: Belief systems, consistency, common priors, cycle equa-
tions.
JEL: D82, D83.
1 The Basic Idea
In a recent note, Rodrigues-Neto [4] has developed an algebraic approach to
verifying whether a given speciﬁcation of posteriors for diﬀerent players is com-
patible with a common prior.1 The algebraic approach provides an alternative
to the syntactic approach of [1], as well as the semantic approaches that are
based on separation theorems ([3], [6]) or on limits of iterated expectations in
Markov chains ([5]). In a model with ﬁnitely many players and a ﬁnite state
space, the algebraic approach requires the veriﬁcation that the posteriors satisfy
a given set of equations, the so-called cycle equations. This note shows that, if,
for any two diﬀerent players, any element of the partitions of the ﬁrst player has
a nonempty intersection with any element of the partitiion of the second player,
then it is actually enough to verify these equations for cycles of length 4 or less.
∗For helpful discussions and comments, I thank Sophie Bade, Christoph Engel, Yossi Fein-
berg, Alia Gizatulina, and Christian Hellwig.
1For a similar result, see Proposition 4 in Hellman and Samet [2].
1The procedure for verifying that posteriors are compatible with a common prior
is thus further simpliﬁed.
To understand the contribution, consider Figure 1, a version of Rodrigues-
Neto’s meet-join diagram. There are two players and nine states of nature.
The diﬀerent states are entered in a square matrix so as to reﬂect the players’
information partititions. Player 1’s partition corresponds to the rows of the
matrix, player 2’s partition to the columns. The column to the left of the
matrix indicates the elements of player 1’s partition, the row at the top the
elements of player 2’s partition.
Figure 1
In this ﬁgure, an oriented horizontal edge leads from one state to another
state in the same row; an oriented vertical edge leads from one state to another
state in the same column. A cycle is given by a sequence of connected horizontal
and vertical edges that leads back to the initial state. An example is given by
the sequence of arrows in the ﬁgure that lead from state 1 to state 3, from state
3 to state 6, from state 6 to state 5, from state 5 to state 8, from state 8 to state
7, and from state 7 back to state 1.
The diﬀerent oriented edges are given diﬀerent weights. The weight of an
edge leading from a state ω1 to a state ω2 is deﬁned as the posterior probability
of the state ω2, as seen by the player who is unable to distinguish between ω1
and ω2. Thus, in Figure 1, the weight of edge 1 → 3 is equal to the posterior
probability of state 3, as seen from the perspective of player 1 when he knows
that the state belongs to the set {1,2,3}. The weight of the reverse edge 3 → 1
is equal to the posterior probability of state 1 from the perspective of player 1
when the state belongs to {1,2,3}.
2A cycle equation requires that the product of the weights of edges along
a given cycle be the same as the product of the weights of edges along the
reverse cycle. Thus, in Figure 1, the product of weights of edges in the cycle
1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1 must be the same as the product of weights of
edges in the reverse cycle 1 → 7 → 8 → 5 → 6 → 3 → 1. This requirement is
nontrivial because the weight assigned to any one edge is usually not the same
as the weight assigned to the reverse edge. For example, there is no reason
why, in Figure 1, the weights of the edges 1 → 3 and 3 → 1, i.e. the posterior
probabilities of states 3 and 1, as seen from the perspective of player 1 when
the state belongs to {1,2,3}, should be the same.
Rodrigues-Neto [4] shows that a given system of posteriors for diﬀerent
agents is compatible with a common prior if and only if the cycle equation
is satisﬁed for every cycle. This note shows that, for an interesting class of case,
the condition of Rodrigues-Neto is satisﬁed if and only if the cycle equation is
satisﬁed for every cycle of length 4 or less.
The reason is that the diﬀerent cycle equations are not independent. For
any longer cycle, the validity of the cycle equation is implied by the validity of
the cycle equations for shorter cycles. Thus, in the two-player example of Figure
1, validity of the cycle equation for the cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1,
which has six edges, is implied by the cycle equations for the three cycles shown
in Figure 2, namely, 1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1, 1 → 4 → 5 → 2 → 1, and
1 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1, all of which have four edges.
Figure 2
We can think of the cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1 in Figure 1
as being "mimicked" by the cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1 → 4 → 5 → 2 →
31 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1, which is obtained by joining the three shorter cycles
1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1, 1 → 4 → 5 → 2 → 1, and 1 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1 in Figure
2. The word "mimicked" here must be taken with a grain of salt. Some of the
edges of the cycle in Figure 1, namely 6 → 5 and 5 → 8, are not also edges of
the cycles in Figure 2. Moreover, some of the edges of the cycles in Figure 2 are
not also edges of the cycle in Figure 1. However, the "missing" edges 6 → 5 and
5 → 8 in the cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1 in Figure 1 have counterparts
in the shorter cycles that have exactly the same weights and therefore make
exactly the same contributions to the cycle equation. Speciﬁcally, the weights
of the edges 6 → 5 in Figure 1 and 4 → 5 in Figure 2 are the same; they are both
given by the conditional probability that player 1 assigns to the state 5 given the
information that the state belongs to the set {4,5,6}. Similarly, the weights of
the edge 5 → 8 in Figure 1 and 2 → 8 in Figure 2 are also the same. Once these
equivalences are taken into account, the "excess" of edges in Figure 2 over the
cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1 in Figure 1 is seen to be redundant in the
sense that, e.g., the edges 4 → 1 and 1 → 4 just neutralize each other because
their combined contributions to the two sides of the cycle equation is exactly the
same. Therefore, the cycle equation for the cycle 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1
in Figure 1 is equivalent to the cycle equation for the more roundabout cycle
1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1 → 4 → 5 → 2 → 1 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1 in Figure 2, which in
turn is implied by the cycle equations for the shorter cycles 1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1,
1 → 4 → 5 → 2 → 1, and 1 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1.
This ﬁnding reﬂects a general principle, which is applicable whenever a cycle
with more than four edges can be mimicked in this way by a combination of
shorter cycles.
A mimicking of longer cycles by combinations of shorter cycles is not always
possible. An example is provided by the six-edge cycle 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 →
6 → 1 in Figure 3. Whereas in Figures 1 and 2, each element of the partition of
player 2 can be reached from each element of the partition of player 1, and vice
versa, in Figure 3, for example, the element {2,3} of the partition of player 2
cannot be reached from the element {5,6} of player 1.2
2At ﬁrst sight, the notion that certain elements of the partition of player 2 cannot be
reached from a given element of the partition of player 1 seems to depend on the particular
representation of states, events, and information in Figure 3. For suppose that we add three
states, (Row 1, Column 3), (Row 2, Column 1), (Row 3, Column 2), to the six-state model of
Figure 2, while maintaining the interpretation of rows and columns as representing the players’
respective partitions. Then the element Column 2 of player 2’s partition can be reached from
the element Row 3 of player 1’s partition. However, in this extended model, conditional
probabilities of the state (Row 3, Column 2) from the perspectives of both players must be
equal to zero. If conditional probabilities can be equal to zero, the mimicking operation in
Figure 1 does not work. For example, if, in Figure 1, both player 1 and player 2 assign
conditional probability zero to state 4, then the cycle equation for the roundabout cycle
1 → 3 → 6 → 4 → 1 → 4 → 5 → 2 → 1 → 2 → 8 → 7 → 1 is trivially satisﬁed but this
does not permit any inference about the cycle equation for 1 → 3 → 6 → 5 → 8 → 7 → 1.
Rodrigues-Neto [4] assumes that all relevant conditional probabilities are strictly positive.
4Figure 3
If each element of a player’s partition can be reached from each element of
any other player’s partition, such a constellation cannot arise. In the following,
I will show that any speciﬁcation of posteriors which satisﬁes this condition is
compatible with a common prior if and only if the cycle equation is satisﬁed for
every cycle of length 4 or less.
2 Formal Statement and Proof of the Result
The framework of the formal analysis is the same as in Rodrigues-Neto [4]. There
are J players j = 1,...,J. There are also n possible states of nature ω = 1,...,n.











n), where, for each state ω, θ
j
ω > 0 is the posterior probability that
player j assigns to the state ω when he is informed that the true state belongs
to the unique element πj(ω) of the partition Πj that contains ω. For any set
π
j
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The question is under what conditions on θ
1,θ
2,...,θ
J such a prior exists.
To answer this question, Rodrigues-Neto introduces the concepts of (ori-
ented) edge and cycle. An edge is an ordered triple (j,ωp,ωq) such that ωp
5and ωq are two states belonging to the same element of player j’s partition, i.e.




that, for k = 1,...K−1, ωk
q = ωk+1
p and, moreover, ωK
q = ω1
p. The opposite of the
edge (j,ωp,ωq) is the edge (j,ωq,ωp) that involves the same player but has the









p)} that is obtained by taking the oppo-




q ) and reversing their order.
The oriented edge (j,ωp,ωq) is given the weight θ
j
ωq. Note that this weight
is independent of ωp. Independence of ωp reﬂects the fact that the conditional
probability which player j assigns to the state ωq is the same for all states ωp
that belong to the same element πj(ωq) as the state ωq itself.
Given the weights θ
j



















p. The following result is proved in Rodrigues-Neto [4].





















Building on this result, I obtain:
Proposition 2 Assume that, for all players j,k  = j, all πj ∈ Πj and all
πk ∈ Πk, πj ∩ πk  = ∅. Then the posteriors θ
1,θ
2,...,θ
J are compatible with




k=1 with K ≤ 4.




J are compatible with a common prior  , then the cycle equation (2)
must hold for every cycle {(jk,ωk
p,ωk
q)}K
k=1 with K ≤ 4. To prove that, under
the additional assumption on the partitions Π1,...,ΠJ, the converse is also true,




with K ≤ 4, then it also holds for every cycle {(jk,ωk
p,ωk
q)}K
k=1 with K > 4.
The argument proceeds by induction on K. Suppose that the cycle equation








k=1 with K edges. Fix some ˆ   = j3. Using the assumption
that πj ∩ πk  = ∅ for all πj ∈ Πj and all πk ∈ Πk, for all j and k  = j, let
ˆ ω be an element of πj
3
(ω3
p) ∩ πˆ (ωK






q), ˆ ω is also an
element of πj3
(ω3
q) ∩ πˆ (ωK
q ). Thus, (j3,ω3
p, ˆ ω),(ˆ , ˆ ω,ωK
q ),(ˆ ,ωK
q , ˆ ω),(j3, ˆ ω,ω3
q)
6are all admissible edges. If, in the cycle {(jk,ωk
p,ωk
q)}K
k=1, the edge (j3,ω3
p,ω3
q)
is replaced by the four edges (j3,ω3
p, ˆ ω),(ˆ , ˆ ω,ωK
q ),(ˆ ,ωK
q , ˆ ω), and (j3, ˆ ω,ω3
q),
the result is a K + 3-edge cycle.3 This K + 3-edge cycle is made up of two
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and the K−1-edge cycle (ˆ ,ωK
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The validity of (2) for the cycle {(jk,ωk
p,ωk
q)}K
k=1 follows immediately. The
induction is thereby complete.
If we think of the state as a vector ω = (t1,...,tJ) of "types" tj of the diﬀerent
players, the assumption that any element of any player’s partition intersects any
element of any other player’s partition is equivalent to the assumption that the
state space is equal to the product
J ￿
j=1
Tj of type spaces for the diﬀerent players,
so that, for any j and k  = j and any types tj ∈ Tj and tk ∈ Tk, upon observing
that his own type is tj, player j cannot completely rule out the possibility that
player k’s type is tk. Types may be correlated, but not to such an extent that
the observation of a player’s own type allows him to reduce the set of types
that are considered to be possible for other agents. For any model exhibiting
such a product structure, Proposition 2 asserts that th egiven posteriors are
compatible with a common prior if and only if the cycle equations hold for any
cycles of length 4 or less.
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